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Free Speech: An Ethical Approach  
 
Introduction:  
Freedom of speech and freedom of expression are two hallmark pillars of American 
magnificence. Such liberties are essential to American democracy and should always be revered 
and protected. Unfortunately, it is easy for people to misuse these rights and spew hateful, 
though constitutionally protected, rhetoric. But just because one has the right to say something 
does not make it ethically right to say. It is my hope that people, for the most part, genuinely 
want to have open discussions in ethical and respectful manners. In order to do so, people ought 
to develop and internalize methods that allow them to ethically engage in speech. Ethically 
engaging in speech is essential as it encourages intellectual diversity while also ensuring that 
virtually no voice or opinion is silenced. In this thesis, I first review existing literature to explore 
the pros and cons of arguments for circumscribing speech and for accepting uncensored speech. 
One side of the debate favors regulations, while the other end of the debate essentially advocates 
for limitless expressions. This leaves a tough problem with which individuals must grapple 
because offense is inevitable in society. And in order to negotiate this issue, people should 
actively try to cultivate strategies that allow them to ethically engage in speech, especially when 
speaking about sensitive subjects.  
 I then look to John Stuart Mill and Michel Foucault as authorities on developing a code 
of ethical speech before finally making my own recommendations for ethical speech. In the final 
chapter, I outline different ways in which people can ethically exercise free speech in everyday, 
mundane situations such as in public, at work and an educational settings if they so choose. 
  
Developing an everyday ethics of free speech is important as we are all sharing this country with 
millions of other opinionated individuals. We should be seeking to uphold and respect their 
speech freedoms just as we all presumably want ours respected as well. This can be done if 
people actively try to develop an ethical approach to engaging in speech. In all three settings, I 
argue that people should try to not see disagreements as character attacks. I also argue that 
people who choose to ethically exercise free speech ought to try to mentally prepare to respond 
to potentially offensive subject matter with respect and composure.  
Chapter 1: Literature Review 
The First Amendment reads, “Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of 
speech.” De jure the principle of unrestricted speech seems simple and impeccable. Individuals 
in the United States cannot have their expression circumvented by congress. De facto, however, 
the free speech clause of the First Amendment leaves much to interpretation. Individuals are 
often left to grapple with questions as to what type of speech are or are not acceptable in certain 
social situations. Unfortunately, the Supreme Court has been of little help to the practical 
implementation of the First Amendment. The nation’s highest court has historically taken an all-
encompassing view of the Free Speech clause of the First Amendment. “Over the years, the 
courts have clarified when and how speech can, and cannot, be restricted by the government. For 
example, true threats and obscenity are not protected speech. On the other hand, provocative or 
offensive political opinions are protected speech. The government can only regulate protected 
speech in very specific instances, such as protecting public safety or national security.” Court 
decisions have left Americans with necessary but not sufficient parameters to approach free 
speech in day to day affairs. Individuals are left to come up with their own notions of an ethical 
approach to free speech.  
  
As Mark Slage discusses in his article, An Ethical Exploration of Free Expression and 
the Problem of Hate Speech, various scholars have their own takes on how speech should or 
should not be approached. Slage explains that some, like Matsuda, Tsesis, Smolla, Fish and 
Waldron favor at least some restrictions on speech. While others such as Chaffee, Rauch, 
Weinstein, Haiman and Bollinger take an all-encompassing view of free speech.  
The overarching theme of scholars who favor various restrictions on the use of speech 
boils down to protecting and preserving vulnerable populations. Those who advocate for 
measures to curtail expression are genuinely concerned that unchecked speech can exploit the 
inherent inequalities between vulnerable and non-vulnerable populations and evolve into hate 
speech. In Words That Wound, Matsuda emerges as a prominent critical race theorist arguing 
against a libertarian view of speech. According to Matsuda, a libertarian approach is inherently 
flawed because it assumes that all people can voice opinions equally. Matsuda writes, “I do not 
believe that truth will prevail in a rigged game or in a contest where the referees are on the 
payroll of the proponents of falsity. The argument that good speech ultimately drives out bad 
speech rests on a false premise”, (Matsuda, 83). In Matsuda’s eyes, members of non-vulnerable 
populations have louder and more influential voices. She is skeptical of the argument that the 
free speech used by those to express racist and hateful sentiment will be countered by the free 
speech of those who oppose such ideas. Matsuda fears hate speech since, to her, it has the 
capacity to further disenfranchise minorities and susceptible populations. Matsuda would like to 
see restrictions on speech with messages of racial inferiority that are hateful, degrading and 
directed at historically maltreated groups. Matsuda recognizes that only truly harmful speech 
ought to be regulated, not speech and ideas that are merely unpopular. Though she does not point 
  
to a specific way or policy to regulate and restrict harmful speech, Matsuda’s intentions of 
protecting historically exploited populations are commendable.  
Much like Matsuda, Alexander Tsesis is also concerned about the proliferation of 
cataclysmic hate speech. Slage argues that in his article, Destructive Messages: How Hate 
Speech Paves the Way for Harmful Social Movements, Tsesis expresses concern that if hate 
speech is not regulated it will eventually metastasize and compromise societal foundations. 
Tsesis is especially concerned, and rightfully so, that if hate speech is not addressed, violent and 
genuinely dangerous social movements will stem as a result. He fears that hate speech can be 
“systematically developed over time, becoming part of a culturally acceptable dialogue which 
can foster the persecution of minorities.” Tsesis’s fears are not ungrounded. He sees the 
Holocaust and the African American slave trade as examples of how hate speech has been so 
woven into the fabrics of societies that they catalyzed the assault and abhorrent human rights 
violations of certain groups, as Slage points out. According to Tsesis, because such hateful and 
derogatory rhetoric was so normalized in the past, events such as slave trading and the Holocaust 
were permitted to happen. Thus, he thinks that individuals have a moral responsibility to 
circumscribe unchecked free speech in order to ensure no massive violation of human rights 
occurs in the future. He reasons that “to prevent crimes against humanity” in the future 
“narrowly tailored laws should be adopted prohibiting the dissemination of mis-ethnic 
stereotypes which are intended to elicit crimes against outgroups” (Tsesis 11-2). He then remarks 
that it is also the duty of private citizens to “guard vigilantly against unfair treatment of each 
individual, for historical examples show that heinous crimes can be committed anywhere mis-
ethnicity has donned the raiment of acceptable dialogue” (Tsesis 11). Tsesis favors the passage 
of legislation to ensure that certain types of speech never grow into horrific social movements. 
  
While it is understandable why one would want to see legislative action taken, speech is 
inherently subjective. This is where Tsesis’s argument falls short. What is offensive and 
potentially dangerous to one individual, could be easily overlooked and brushed off by another 
individual, even if both have virtually identical backgrounds and experiences. Offense and hate 
speech are not “one size fits all.” In an ideal world, there would be legislation that draws a clear 
line separating hate speech from speech that is just unpopular, however, there can currently be no 
such line drawn because of how intrinsically subjective speech and perceptions of speech are. 
This is a problem because a blanket exclusion of what legislatures classify as hate speech might 
not be considered harmful, even by the people who it aims to protect. The danger here is that 
such an exclusion could unintentionally limit free speech that was mistaken for genuine hate 
speech.  
Tsesis clearly links speech with action, or at least the possibility of action. Other scholars, 
such as Rodney Smolla take a more relaxed view of speech while still advocating for limiting it 
responsibly. In his book, Free Speech in an Open Society, Smolla argues that free speech and 
free expression is influential and necessary as it defines the “imagination, creativity, enterprise, 
rationality, love, worship, and wonder” of the human spirit. To Smolla, this adds intrinsic value 
to society. Free speech and expression allows individuals to explore their own uniqueness and 
dispositions and should be defended at all costs, until such speech adds no intrinsic value to 
society. Slage explains that Smolla recognizes that some types of speech have no place in an 
open society such as sexist and racist sentiment. He argues that, in its most pure from, hate 
speech “states no fact, offers no opinion, (and) proposes no transaction” (Smolla 166). Since no 
societal value is added, Smolla thinks that hate speech ought not to enjoy that same First 
Amendment protections as most other types of speech. It is worth mentioning though that Smolla 
  
is an interesting scholar. His approach to the value of speech is wildly different than most other 
scholars, and he makes it clear that without a broad definition and acceptance of free speech, an 
open society cannot exist. He just thinks that whatever does not directly contribute to an open 
society ought to be circumscribed.  
Stanley Fish makes yet another argument in favor of restricting some types of speech. In 
his work, There’s No Such Thing as Free Speech (And It’s a Good Thing, Too), he becomes 
fixated on the potential harm that words could create. He does not think that those espousing 
libertarian notions of free speech give proper merit and consideration to the dangers of words, as 
Slage elaborates. Such dangers of words include, but are not limited to, speech that fosters 
genuine malice, speech that promotes violence, and speech intended to limit the speech of 
historically marginalized individuals. Slage explains that joining in on Fish’s rejection of the 
libertarian model are scholars such as Jeremy Waldron. In, The Harm in Hate Speech, Waldron 
argues that since the United States has essentially no legal limitations on speech, people spew 
hateful and consequently harmful speech. Waldron, like Fish, is in favor of adding hate speech to 
the limited list of prohibited speech in the United States. He sees this as a means of protecting 
marginalized groups and bringing the voices of vulnerable groups and minorities into the 
conversation. This goal is imperative as giving all voices and opinions a platform is one of the 
most effective ways to foster a dynamic society.  
As Slage asserts, all of these aforementioned scholars do favor restrictions, some more 
than others, to speech. These scholars do not blatantly disregard the First Amendment, they just 
recognize that its all-encompassing notion of speech can easily be abused and used to exploit 
those who have historically been disenfranchised. Their arguments take into account the fact that 
as much as we would all like to believe that all people were created equal - they were not. It is an 
  
unfortunate feature of our society that opportunity and resources are not equally distributed. It is 
noble that these scholars try to account for inherent inequalities and put everyone on the same 
playing field. Some of these scholars also take on the virtually impossible task of advocating for 
legal limitations to the First Amendment.  
Regardless of how they individually approach the matter of limiting free speech, all of 
these scholars envision an idealistic society in which all people feel comfortable to speak. They 
think that by removing the potentially oppressive discourse marginalized groups might 
encounter, a place can be created where all opinions are heard equally. They envision a society in 
which no amount of socioeconomic disparity can silence voices. Everyone, regardless of 
privilege, status, education, or access to resources is given the tools to speak and engage in 
productive and safe conversations.  
Those advocating for restrictions of free speech do have their shortcomings though. 
While they try to foster equality, restricting the voices of any person inherently fosters 
inequality. These scholars also do tend to recognize that speech and feelings toward speech is 
subjective and that it is almost impossible to come up with universal standards of what 
constitutes hate speech and what does not, but they barely explain how to overcome the 
challenge of deciding what universally constitutes hate speech. Furthermore, when discussing the 
possibilities of censorship and the limiting of free speech, one should naturally become wary that 
such practices could promote a lack of intellectual diversity. Protecting free speech is one of the 
most effective ways to ensure that all ideas are at least vocalized. The more people vocalize 
ideas, and the more ideas that are vocalized, the more people can learn about one another and 
about their own individuality. Having such intellectual diversity reduces the chance of having a 
stagnant, one sided society plagued by groupthink.  
  
Much like scholars favoring restrictions of free speech, libertarian scholars are often 
quick to vocalize their opinions on how speech should be approached. One of the earliest modern 
libertarian scholars to comment on the importance of speech, as Slage writes, was Zechariah 
Chaffe. For Chaffe, the protection of free speech and expression was imperative for the pursuit 
of truth and thus imperative for the interest of a society as a whole. He writes “The true meaning 
of freedom of speech seems to be this. One of the most important purposes of society and 
government is the discovery and spread of truth on subjects of general concern. This is possible 
only through absolutely unlimited discussion, for … once force is thrown into the argument, it 
becomes a matter of chance whether it is thrown on the false side or the true, and truth loses all 
its natural advantage in the context.” Slage explains that Chaffe sees unrestricted speech as 
necessary to distinguish between truth and obvious falsehoods. Chaffe’s notion of truth can be 
interpreted to mean the difference between right and wrong. Chaffe highly regards civil liberties 
and wants them to be safeguarded at all costs. To Chaffe, one ought to exist freely in a society, 
but cannot do so if liberties are limited. When looked at jointly, the libertarian response to those 
in favor of restricting speech boils down to egalitarianism, the pursuit of knowledge and the 
promotion of Democratic values. 
 Jonathan Rauch emerged as a fierce defender of free speech in his 1993 work, Kindly 
Inquisitors. He recognizes the critical point, brought up by those favoring limitations to speech, 
that there is no such thing as universal equal opportunities. According to Slagle, Rauch, however 
is steadfast in his belief that all forms of speech must be welcomed and encouraged if there is to 
be any intellectual diversity in society. He arguably views intellectual diversity as just as 
important as racial, ethnic, sexual, and so on, diversity. He argues that “creating knowledge is 
painful, for the same reason it can be exhilarating. Knowledge does not come free to any of us; 
  
we have to suffer for it” (Rauch, 125). To him, creating knowledge is not up for debate. Yes, it 
may be uncomfortable, but it is a necessary discomfort. He also argues that the remedy for free 
speech is actually free speech. Rauch recognizes that humans and bigotry will always coexist and 
can never be mutually exclusive, no matter how much bigoted individuals are ostracized by 
society. He realizes that nothing, neither person nor legislation, can or will stop these people 
from spewing their deplorable opinions. He is, however, hopeful that those who use their First 
Amendment protections to spew hateful rhetoric will be countered by social justice warriors who 
use the very same constitutional protections. In his eyes, these situations have much to offer 
society since knowledge and intellectual growth takes place when tough and often uncomfortable 
conversations are had. He thinks that self-growth and education are fostered by difficult 
conversations.  
Much like Rauch, Slagle explains that James Weinstein argues that counter speech is the 
most effective way of fighting hate speech. To Weinstein, virtually all speech ought to be 
protected and encouraged. In Hate Speech, Pornography, And Radical Attacks on Free Speech 
Doctrine, Weinstein makes clear his thought that hate speech is only genuinely espoused by a 
small minority of the population and is not worth compromising the entire ideal of free speech. 
He is wary of any restrictions of free speech as a direct threat to American brilliance and our 
democratic values. He points to countries where restrictions on hate speech turned into 
restrictions on free speech in general, which then compromised democracies and even further 
disenfranchised minority and vulnerable populations. As Slagle elaborates, Weinstein points to 
some of America’s darkest hours with Japanese internment during World War II as proof that 
restricting speech does far more harm than good (Weinstein 144). He then argues that it should 
be the responsibility of the government to fund those who do not have the adequate resources to 
  
participate in open discussions and to further start public interest campaigns aimed at educating 
individuals about the value of free expression.  
Franklyn Haiman in Speech Acts further defends the libertarian approach to free speech 
by exploiting the weakness of those who favor restrictions to speech. According to Slagle, 
Haiman distinguishes the difference between speech and actions and argues that it is a fallacy to 
blindly believe that offensive speech will led to abhorrent actions. According to Haiman, if 
speech and action were one in the same, “we would have to scrap the First Amendment” 
(Haiman 57). He sees speech as inherently “symbolic, not physical” acts. He further attempts to 
poke holes in the arguments of those who favor restrictions to speech by arguing that reactions to 
speech, in particular hateful speech, will never be uniform. He further states that emotional 
distress is so subjective that it is nearly impossible to quantify, let alone prove. Much like to 
Weinstein, Haiman sees free speech and expression as too important to limit.  
Finally, Lee Bollinger advances the idea that speech is too central to society to limit by 
taking a rather unusual approach. Much like the aforementioned libertarian scholars, Bollinger 
does acknowledge the reservations of individuals who see speech as an avenue to potentially 
cause harm. In The Tolerant Society he gives merit to those who disagree with him and 
recognizes the fact that outlandish sentiment can be harmful and have no value to society. But to 
Bollinger, this type of harmful speech is a necessary evil. According to Slagle, Bollinger thinks 
that all types of speech ought to be practiced in and accepted by society. He argues that inclusion 
of speech, even hate speech, is beneficial to both those who speak it and to those who are 
offended by it as he thinks this forces individuals to generally become more tolerant. Bollinger 
places great value on the idea of tolerance and sees it as intrinsically good. He hopes that when 
people are exposed to various ideas, they are able to connect with their fellow humans and 
  
hopefully realize that we have more commonalities than we have differences. People ought to 
realize that they coexist with individuals who do not share their same exact thoughts, 
experiences, world views, and values. According to Slagle, Bollinger sees civil interactions 
between these two polar opposite ends of the speech spectrum as an avenue to practice tolerance 
and decorum.  
Much like the scholars who favor limitations on free speech, those espousing libertarian 
views of free speech make these arguments because they envision a society that is inherently 
good. Those adhering to the libertarian model think that society should be a place in which all 
are able to freely engage in discussion of all topics. They would like to live in a world that is 
always evolving and always full of thought and discussion. They see unrestricted speech as a 
means of continual education and self-improvement. Their goal is to foster a society in which 
everyone is equal and in which everyone feels safe to share thoughts.  
Though the libertarian model seems effective in encouraging truth, knowledge, 
intellectual diversity and egalitarianism, it almost guarantees that individuals will be offended or 
afraid to speak and inevitably resort to self-censorship at one point or another. One must realize 
that even though it is often unquantifiable, damaging emotional stress can result from such 
speech. When people are offended act under emotional distress, they do not act rationally. A 
mass of people acting irrationally should concern anyone as the threat of violence increases 
exponentially. Those advocating for the libertarian model also fall short as they unfortunately do 
not account for the fact that in practice, not everyone can use their voices equally. It is wishful 
thinking to assume that marginalized people can use their voices in the same ways that those 
with the most privilege and of the highest socioeconomic status can. There is a very real 
possibility that less privileged groups risk being set back further or further ridiculed by those 
  
who use their speech to keep such populations from progressing. These scholars also fail to 
establish a set of ethics that help guide when and how free speech ought to be exercised.  
Clearly the ideas of both ends of the spectrum have both merit and flaws. If we operate 
under the assumption that the complete curtailing of the First Amendment is out of the question, 
we must find a way to incorporate free speech and decorum into society and into our everyday 
lives.  
Chapter 2: Millian Freedom 
In this chapter, I outline how the Classical Liberal, John Stuart Mill approaches free 
speech. For the most part, Mill advocates for a broad acceptance of speech. For Mill, speech 
should be censored if, and only if, it brings about harm or has the capacity to do so. He 
distinguishes between speech that genuinely harms, and speech that is rude or offensive and 
concludes that offensive speech ought to not be circumscribed. He remedies this acceptance of 
offensive speech, however, by encouraging individuals to use their free speech to counter the 
offensive free speech of another. Individuals have the right to speak, but they do not have the 
absolute right to not have their speech accepted or to go uncontested by another.  
In this chapter, I maintain that recognizing and observing this Millian principle is a good 
place to start if one wants to actively work to practice ethical speech. Yet, this chapter also 
argues that solely looking to Mill to come up with a code of ethics to guide speech would be 
insufficient as he never discusses ethics when advocating for free speech. It would furthermore 
be a mistake to just look to Mill for this task because Mill thought that some groups of people 
were innately more capable of civility and exercising free speech than others. Not only is this 
conviction degrading, it is also completely baseless and does not encourage open discussion with 
individuals who have different world views. All people are equally capable of choosing to 
ethically exercise free speech. There is no one group that is inherently better at this than another. 
  
Still, despite his flaws, Mill is effective in championing the idea that most speech should be 
accepted. And it is this broad acceptance of speech that people should first try to master if they 
want to engage in ethical speech since, by definition, speech cannot be ethically exercised if 
there is no speech in the first place.  
  
Mill and Speech that Harms: 
Mill describes freedom as, “the inward domain of consciousness.” More simply put, the 
freedom of speech for Mill is “liberty of thought” and the “absolute freedom of opinion and 
sentiment on all subjects” (Mill 11). Mill argues that individuals need to be able to speak, think 
and act without infringement so long as they do not become “a nuisance to other people” (Mill 
53). In Mill’s view, people ought to do and speak as they please so long as no other person is 
harmed as a result. The observance of the harm principle guarantees that “the only purpose for 
which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his 
will, is to prevent harm to others.” In other words, adhering to the Millian harm principle 
ensures that individuals in a “civilized” society will only be censored if not doing so would bring 
harm to at least one other individual. Mill, however, did not think that the freedom of expression 
applied to all individuals equally. He only trusted “civilized” populations with such a luxury. 
Excluding certain individuals from exercising free speech is one of Mill’s greatest blunders, and 
will be discussed later in this chapter. Regardless of this ignorance, Mill laid the framework for 
approaching speech in a free society. The Millian school of thought, commonly referred to as 
classical liberalism, perceives freedom of speech as not just the ability to speak freely, but also as 
the privilege to feel safe from harm living as free speech exercising members of a society. The 
threat of being silenced or blackballed is a threat to the secure feelings to which members of 
society are entitled. If one does not feel safe in society, that individual can never freely speak or 
  
act in public without fear of retribution.  
One of the most notable exceptions to the unrestricted notion of speech for Mill is speech 
that harms. Exactly what constitutes harm for Mill is something with which many contemporary 
individuals probably grapple. Mill never directly states what types of actions and speech 
universally constitute harm. Rather, deciding whether or not something elicits harm ought to be 
evaluated on a case by case basis, as Mill does not set a universal standard for what evokes harm 
and what does not. While Mill does not explicitly say what types of words and actions will 
always bring about harm, he does give examples of situations that potentially cause harm. Mill 
writes: 
 
“Opinions lose their immunity when the circumstances in which they are expressed are 
such as to constitute their expression a positive instigation to some mischievous act. An opinion 
that corn-dealers are starvers of the poor, or that private property is robbery, ought to be 
unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may justly incur punishment when 
delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the house of a corn-dealer, or when handed 
about among the same mob in the form of a placard. Acts, of whatever kind, which, without 
justifiable cause, do harm to others, may be, and in the more important cases absolutely require 
to be, controlled by the unfavourable sentiments, and, when needful, by the active interference of 
mankind. The liberty of the individual must be thus far limited; he must not make himself a 
nuisance to other people” (Mill 56). 
 
Though he never gives a concrete definition of harm, he alludes to harm as something that 
causes, or has the potential, to cause injury to individuals. In the excerpt above, Mill contends 
that merely speaking unfavorably about corn dealers is harmless, and he would in fact likely 
welcome the opinion as it could promote intellectual diversity. He takes issue, however, when 
that same opinion is exclaimed to a riled up mob in close proximity to the corn dealer’s house. 
The distinction for Mill is that the person sharing his or her opinion in front of an active mob 
could logically incite that mob to physically attack the corn dealer’s property, family, or the corn 
  
dealer himself. For Mill, the speaker exciting a mob is exploiting the inherent tendencies for 
larger groups of people with misplaced excitement to devolve into the lowest common 
denominator. This would thus impose on the liberties of the corn dealer, hence constituting 
harm, which would disqualify the opinion from censorship protections in a Millian society. A 
more contemporary example of harmful speech that would be disallowed in a Millian society is 
the speech used by Michelle Carter, the then Massachusetts teen who allegedly encouraged her  
ex-boyfriend to commit suicide via text message. Carter was recently convicted of involuntary 
manslaughter, and in convicting her, the judge focused on the fact that she texted her former 
boyfriend to “get back in” the vehicle that he climbed out of while it was filling with carbon 
monoxide. While it is not contested that Carter did not physically force her former partner to kill 
himself, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court reasoned that the evidence proved her words 
caused her former boyfriend’s death, and were thus not protected by the First Amendment. Just 
as the hypothetical orator exploited the excitement of the mob to cause harm, Carter exploited 
her former boyfriend’s weakened mental state and trust in her to engage in harmful speech. Thus, 
such speech is not deserving of protections. Mill would likely agree with the ruling. While 
Carter’s words by themselves would not have been problematic, the fact that she was fully aware 
of the situation and used rhetoric that prompted immediate and harmful actions, means her text 
messages do not qualify as free speech. Mill would say that because she knew her words had the 
capacity to inflict bodily harm upon her ex-partner, her words would “lose their immunity” and 
would not be classified as protected speech. 
It is important to note that simply using offensive rhetoric or articulating a commonly 
abhorred opinion does not constitute harm. As long as one does not turn speech into violent 
  
action, some proponents of unrestricted speech might maintain that there is no such thing as 
“hate speech” and rather say that only unpopular and possibly offensive speech exists. Again, 
Mill makes this point clear as he differentiates between someone merely badmouthing corn 
dealers versus when the same sentiment is presented to an angry mob in front of the corn dealer’s 
house. The latter carries the potential to cause physical harm to the corn dealer, and/or the corn 
dealer’s property, thus classifying it as harmful and unwelcomed speech. Even if the mob never 
took action, the fact that they could is enough for Mill to classify this as harmful speech that 
ought to be curtailed. There is harm in instigating violence even if violence does not occur 
because individuals then live in fear that they could potentially be attacked or harmed at any 
given time. If individuals live with such fear, it is safe to assume that their constant state of dread 
and agitation could prevent them from  expressing opinions, partaking in certain activities, and 
visiting certain places, which essentially limits their ability to fully exist in a free Millian society. 
Thus, both the incitement of violence and the mere threat of such are harmful and can be taken as 
a direct threat to freedom, as Mill sees it. Even when such instigation is not accompanied by 
violent action, it still poses a direct threat to freedom as people living in a constant state of fear 
may likely alter their life choices so as to avoid harm, harassment, hateful actions, and the like. 
For Mill, one of the very few exceptions to free speech is the aforementioned violence 
and threat of such. Aside from this type of ill-favored speech, Mill is not generally concerned 
with morality and thinks that all individuals ought to be given free scope in life. Mill equates 
human nature to a tree. Mill states that, “Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, 
and set to do exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop 
itself on all sides, according to the tendency of inward forces which make it a living thing”, (Mill 
56-7). Mill wants individuals to just grow and exist in society without hindrance from external 
  
factors. As what is now known as a classical liberal, Mill regards highly individual choices and 
personal liberties. For Mill, individuals making their own choices that best suit their own life 
paths is a necessary condition of freedom. The way he sees it, one cannot be truly free if he or 
she attempts to shape his or her life according to a perceived societal “model.” Instead, Millian 
freedom advocates for individuals using their own unique life experiences to create their own 
character and individuality. Freedom for Mill is this self-character creation. Thus, Mill sees it as 
a principal human function that individuals are given the opportunity to develop as just that - 
unique individuals. Mill thinks we grow and develop ourselves through the establishment and 
discussions of our inward forces, such as our individual thoughts. Because thoughts are so 
imperative to the cultivation of our inward forces, and thus by default to the cultivation of our  
individuality, we ought to only resort to censorship when it is absolutely necessary, such as when 
harm is imminent. Otherwise, individuality is so important for Mill that all other ideas and 
opinions should be voiced and explored. Exposure to different world views and sentiments 
enhances one’s ability to make sense of his or her own thoughts and inward forces and thus leads 
to one being better suited to create his or her own unique character. A society filled with 
individuals who constantly evaluate their own thoughts and inward forces in addition to being 
 
exposed to the inward forces of their contemporaries will undoubtedly be a dynamic society. 
 
Mill states: 
 
“As it is useful that while mankind are imperfect there should be different opinions, so it 
is that there should be different experiments of living; that free scope should be given to varieties 
of character, short of injury to others; and that the worth of different modes of life should be 
proved practically, when anyone thinks fit to try them. It is desirable, in short, that in things 
which do not primarily concern others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person’s 
own character, but the traditions or customs of other people are the rule of conduct, there is 
wanting one of the principal ingredients of human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of 
individual and social progress” (Mill 53). 
 
  
Therefore, it can be said that intellectual diversity and overall societal development benefits from 
the open discussion, and not the censorship, of our inward forces, even if such open discussion 
causes individuals discomfort. 
 
Mill and Speech That Shames:  
In On Liberty, Mill makes they key distinction between speech that is genuinely harmful 
and speech that is merely offensive and unpleasant. Harmful speech would cause harm, have the 
potential to harm, or interfere with individuals independently making their own life choices. 
Uncomfortable speech may just be accepting the fact that what one thinks he or she knows for 
certain might not hold true for another individual. Often times, realizing what one thought he or 
she knew is not a universal truth causes unease, but this unease ought to be embraced in order to 
avoid a static society. Mill writes:  
 
“Mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most part, are only half-truths; that 
unity of opinion, unless resulting from the fullest and freest comparison of opposite opinions, is 
not desirable, and diversity not an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more capable than at 
present of recognising all sides of the truth, are principles applicable to men’s modes of action, 
not less than to their opinions” (Mill 53). 
 
To Mill, speech is not always a condition of comfort, and requires that individuals accept the fact 
that others have opinions that they find offensive, and still listen to such opinions before 
articulating a rebuttal. This can be quite difficult as individuals are required to respect people 
holding ideas perceived as deplorable. Millian free speech requires tolerance for opposing views. 
Free speech requires being uncomfortable. In Mill’s view, listening to opposing views and then 
critiquing such ideas in an open conversation is welcome and encouraged as it does not incite 
violence and promotes societal diversity. Listeners should absorb the information being 
presented and openly critique various ideas in order to form their own opinions; this is how a 
society progresses. And for Mill, an ever evolving and dynamic society is desirable and 
  
intrinsically good. Mill is clear that having free speech is not a necessarily a free for all, but is to 
be exercised in nonviolent ways that are conducive to a society that is composed of intellectually 
diverse individuals. Free speech enables individuals to learn about themselves and further their 
own thoughts in addition to learning about the perspectives of others. With free speech there is 
always something to learn from everyone, and this constant attainment of new information and 
perspectives is valuable to Mill as it creates individuals with independent thoughts and prevents 
an intellectually static culture. For Mill, unnecessary censorship and the circumventing of free 
expression, is a plague to intellectual societal growth. 
 Mill is not blind to the fact that if free speech is to be welcomed in a society, it is almost 
inevitable that someone will spew disdainful and inappropriate rhetoric from time to time. To 
remedy this, Mill suggests that individuals not only use their free speech to dissent and counter 
the offender’s speech, he goes further and maintains that is is acceptable to publicly shame or 
humiliate an offensive person. Mill elaborates: 
 
“There is a degree of folly, and a degree of what may be called (though the phrase is not 
unobjectionable) lowness or deprivation of taste, which, though it cannot justify doing harm to 
the person who manifests it, renders him necessarily and properly a subject of distaste, or, in 
extreme cases, even of contempt: a person could not have the opposite qualities in due strength 
without entertaining these feelings. Though doing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to 
compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order: and since 
this judgment and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to 
warn him of it beforehand, as of any other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes 
himself. It would be well, indeed, if this good office were much more freely rendered than the 
common notions of politeness at present permit, and if one person could honestly point out to 
another that he thinks him in fault, without being considered unmannerly or presuming. We have 
a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to the 
oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are not bound, for example, to 
seek his society; we have a right to avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a 
right to choose the society most acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to 
caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious 
effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others a preference over him in optional 
good offices, except those which tend to his improvement” (Mill 71-2). 
 
  
For Mill, a free society requires essentially unrestricted speech. In a free society, individuals do 
have the right to offend, but these offenders do not get to speak without consequence. Though 
their speech might not be punishable by law, as Mill puts it, their speech can and should be 
punishable by judgement from their fellow compatriots. For Mill, harm and shame are not 
synonymous. Harmful speech ought to be restricted, while speech that intends to shame ought to 
be embraced when necessary. When individuals are allowed to shame each other for deplorable 
opinions, it forces people to be more pragmatic when speaking. Of course, shame will not be a 
total deterrent for offensive speech, but it should eventually make individuals think about 
ensuing consequences of offensive speech. Though free speech should be revered and embraced, 
speech has consequences. Just because an individual has the right to say something offensive 
does not make it morally right to say. The fact that individuals can be shamed, looked down 
upon or be treated unfavorably for their opinions helps to maintain social order and helps to 
ensure that an anarchic free for all does not ensue. Shame helps to ensure that individuals are 
held accountable for legally permissible, though socially unacceptable speech. Though shaming 
individuals might be effective in limiting offensive speech, it certainly does not qualify as 
ethically engaging in free speech. If one resorts to shame, it is possible that he or she actually 
discourages productive conversations. Shaming also has the potential to be counterproductive by 
heightening interpersonal tensions as opposed to serving as a method of tolerance and inclusion.  
 
Mill and Imperialism:  
Mill and his laissez-fare approach to speech and expression have been both criticized and 
revered. Aside from the most obvious reprimand of Mill that Utilitarianism and Classical 
Liberalism by definition cannot inherently coexist, is his distressing defense of British 
  
Imperialism. For  someone as dedicated to individual liberties and self-determination as Mill, his 
justification of 19th Century expansionism might come as a surprise. 
Jennifer Pitts in, A Turn to Empire: The Rise of Imperial Liberalism in Britain and 
France, explains that in the late 18th Century, ideas of imperialism and expansionism were 
looked down upon by prominent scholars. Pitts explains that the underlying thoughts behind the 
rejection of imperialism were the disruption of the individual culture of the conquered people 
and was moreover seen as unethical for the pain and suffering it brought conquered populations. 
Prior to the 19th Century, Pitts describes there being a sense of respect for autonomous cultures, 
much like classical liberals tend to have, at least, some respect for autonomous individuals. 
Unfortunately, by the 1800s, this sense of cultural respect seemed to vanish, and instead 
individuals like Mill championed imperialistic ideas, which seem to contradict the notion of 
laissez-faire individualism. In fact, Pitts points out that Mill believed that “backwards” cultures 
could be enlightened and rehabilitated through expansionism and colonialism. 
Mill’s lack of regard for all people and all cultures is one of the biggest faults in his work. 
Even though he was a champion of individual and women’s rights, Mill genuinely believed that 
there were subsets of the population who were inherently not equipped to be trusted with 
freedom of speech and expression. In his introductory chapter in On Liberty, Mill states that 
“more civilised portions of the species” possess the ability to exercise certain freedoms, such as 
freedom of speech and expression, whereas the less “civilised” do not. Pitts explains that the 
notion that a certain group of people is inherently more civilized and more worthy of freedom is 
a motif throughout his work. As Pitts demonstrates, Mill’s convictions are baseless and not 
grounded in any form of credible data.   
Mill most notably explains that, “the only purpose for which power can be rightfully 
  
exercised over any member of a civilised community, against his will, is to prevent harm to  
others” (Mill 13). As Pitts points out, Mill is an imperialist. Being an imperialist, his choices of 
rhetoric are no accident. The fact that Mill chooses to include the term “civilised community” 
when introducing his harm principle clearly indicates that those who he does not consider to be 
civilized do not get to enjoy the same speech and expression freedoms. Returning to the passage 
where he describes the importance of letting one’s thoughts and inward forces shape his or her 
character, Mill writes: 
 
“It really is of importance, not only what men do, but also what manner of men they are 
that do it. Among the works of man, which human life is rightly employed in perfecting and 
beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself. Supposing it were possible to get 
houses built, corn grown, battles fought, causes tried, and even churches erected and prayers 
said, by machinery—by automatons in human form—it would be a considerable loss to exchange 
for these automatons even the men and women who at present inhabit the more civilised parts of 
the world, and who assuredly are but starved specimens of what nature can and will produce. 
Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do exactly the work 
prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop itself on all sides, according to 
the tendency of the inward forces which make it a living thing” ( Mill 55). 
 
Again, the idea that individuals ought to be free to express their opinions and use their unique 
life experiences to shape their character, does not apply to individuals who do not “inhabit the 
more civilised parts of the world.” This should alarm any contemporary reader of Mill. Pitts 
points out the paradox that it does not follow that Mill is so committed to advocating for 
individuality and the rights of the individual, but at the same time maintains that some people are 
inherently more civilized than others and are thus deserving of more freedom. Even more 
alarmingly, Mill’s characterization of individuals as “uncivilised” was just a hypocritical way for 
him to avoid open discussions with individuals who had different opinions and different worldly 
experiences than he did. His imperialist approach tragically did not afford a diverse group of 
individuals the opportunity to partake in discussion. This is in part why relying solely on John 
  
Stuart Mill for guidance on how to ethically approach and engage in free speech is not sufficient. 
Freedoms ought to be universal, and there is no demographic that is inherently more deserving or 
capable of exercising liberties. 
Even with his incompatible philosophy, some scholars do come to the defense of Mill. 
John Gray, for example upholds Mill’s notion of liberty. Gray explains, “the judgment of J. S. 
Mill as a hopelessly muddled thinker may yet be ill-founded and certainly remains  
premature...our view of Mill has been badly obscured by the hasty and presumptuous judgment 
of Mill's substantive argument by the philosophers and social theorists of the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries” (Gray). Traditionally, Mill’s writings are criticized on one front as not 
being inclusive, and on another front as being devoid of any universal moral principles and 
centered on individual pursuits of autonomy. Gray, however, credits Mill with articulating moral 
principles in regards to the preservation of liberty when Mill advocated for utilitarianism in his 
“Doctrine of Liberty.” Gray explains that: 
 
“Mill's liberty principle is, at first sight at least, a very stringent test of the legitimacy of 
state interference...For it condemns as illegitimate any restriction of liberty by state or society 
which is not designed to prevent men from harming one another. And, further, taken together 
with Mill's principles about enforcing morality, it yields a substantive criterion or moral 
wrongness. An act (or whatever) is morally wrong, if and only if punishing it both would prevent 
harm to others and would be maximally expedient. (We must always remember here that 
"punishment”, for Mill, includes the sanctions of public opinion and the goads of conscience as 
well as legal penalties.) Mill's doctrine of liberty claims that the requirements of morality will be 
maximally expedient if they are themselves minimalist: we maximize utility if we restrict 
morality to questions of harm-prevention” (Gray). 
 
Gray uses Mill as an authority figure for guidance on how to conduct oneself morally and 
ethically. For Gray, Mill’s principles yield a form of moral and ethical standards. Gray sees 
Mill’s notion of preserving individuality while at the same time harm thwarting as intrinsically 
good, moral, and desirable. Gray uses Mill’s doctrine to argue that people ought to be free to 
  
pursue their own happiness and that nobody should act in ways that limit the capacity for another 
individual to be happy. He maintains that anything that would unnecessarily limit an individual’s 
freedom is morally wrong. For Gray, this moral standard is the ability to speak and exist freely 
while only limiting freedoms when not doing so would cause harm. Thus, Gray applies the 
Millian notion of letting one live freely so long as he or she does not create harm, to argue that 
individuals, and the state, have moral obligations to consciously avoid interference with  
another’s individuality. In his defense of Mill, Gray has chosen to ignore the fact that when Mill 
wrote about his notions of freedom, he intentionally excluded certain people. 
Isaiah Berlin also offers a defense of Mill in Four Essays on Liberty. Like Mill, Berlin 
fears a static society in which people essentially scare themselves into willingly giving up 
their own liberties. Berlin certainly sides with Mill’s notion of freedom, and his most notable 
defenses of Mill come in his third and fourth essays. 
In his third essay, Berlin advocates for “human responsibility” and describes and 
differentiates between “positive liberty” and “negative liberty.” For Berlin, uncompromised 
freedom is essential for his notion of human responsibility. He reasons that in order to be 
responsible, self-deterministic human beings, individuals must have essentially unchecked 
freedom to do, say and act as they please. If this liberty that he describes exists as “positive 
liberty”, the freedom is placed on the individual. Essential questions at the heart of positive 
freedom include, how much can one influence another, and how much can one influence his or 
her environment. On the other hand, if the liberty exists as “negative liberty”, then the liberty is 
on a force other than the individual. Negative liberty is concerned with what cannot be done to 
an individual, and how much personal liberty is he or she willing to relinquish. Berlin fears, as 
would Mill, that too much negative liberty could interfere with another individual’s autonomy, 
  
and too much positive liberty could make a society fall victim to groupthink and strip it of its 
intellectual diversity. Unfortunately, neither Mill not Berlin offer concrete suggestions for how to 
approach this liberty dilemma. 
The persistent problem with Mill and existing scholarship is that there is no universal 
standard established that gives individuals an unfailing moral or ethical code when approaching 
speech. Most of the time, Mill’s notion of unrestricted speech is left alone, and just accepted on  
its face, without further thought into what should or should not be said regardless of what type of 
harm might arise as a result. Just looking to Mill for guidance on how to appropriately free 
speech is insufficient. 
Mill does not give individuals any direction on what types of problems might arise in 
society when virtually all forms of speech are permitted and encouraged. Moreover, he 
intentionally left out distinct groups of individuals when he wrote about who has certain liberties 
and who does not. He also does not have a comprehensive method from saying what may or may 
not create harm, like insulting a corn dealer in the press versus insulting the corn dealer in front 
of an excited mob, he just uses his intuition. While there is nothing inherently wrong with using 
one’s intuition as part of a moral compass, there should be set universal standards that can 
always guide individuals to conduct themselves ethically. Accepting Mill’s view of restricting 
harmful speech is a good starting point in establishing such standards, and is necessary, but not 
sufficient. Individuals ought to strive for intellectual diversity while simultaneously ensuring that 
all members feel welcome enough to participate in a conversation in order to successfully coexist 
in a society. Millian freedom lacks this ideal, and is only concerned with the avoidance of harm. 
But in order for free speech to be successfully and productively utilized, individuals should not 
  
fear voicing their opinions and should feel respected and validated by their peers, even in 
uncomfortable and vulnerable situations.  
 
Chapter 3: Foucault 
Perhaps the biggest issue with looking to John Stuart Mill to help develop guidelines for an 
ethical approach to free speech is the fact that he only thinks harmful speech should be censored. 
If an individual solely relied on Mill to internally create ethical guidelines for free speech, he or 
she would likely end up behaving unethically. Millian logic assumes that something could 
ethically be said if it does not directly bring about harm or have the potential to cause harm to an 
individual. Naturally, this broad acceptance of speech allows almost anything to be said. This 
could theoretically excuse a great deal of hurtful, unethical sentiment. Just because one has the 
right to say something, does not automatically make it morally right to say. Michel Foucault 
understands this, and uses his notion of parrhesia to explain how individuals can begin to 
examine an ethical approach to free speech. In this chapter, I look to Foucault’s Fearless Speech  
as not only a rebuke to Mill, but also as a guiding authority on how practicers of speech should 
act. I then use Nancy Luxon, who reads Foucault as a normative argument about how one should 
ethically conduct him or herself, to argue that Foucault’s idea that only a select number of people 
possess inherent qualities making them suitable to be truth tellers is inadequate as it is elitist and 
assumes that average people are incapable of productive conversation. Before outlining 
guidelines that can be used by individuals who desire to ethically engage in free speech in the 
last chapter, I here argue that just by virtue of being human, all people are qualified to speak their 
own truths. 
 
Foucault’s Parrhesia:  
  
 In Fearless Speech, Foucault focuses on what he calls parrhesia. The literal translated 
meaning of parrhesia is "to say everything.” Thus, one who uses parrhesia is one who says 
everything, or speaks freely. Foucault writes that one who practices parrhesia does not self 
censor and articulates his or her ideas completely and directly, so that, ideally, nothing is left to 
the imagination of his or her audience. He writes: 
 
“The one who uses parrhesia, the parrhesiastes, is someone who says everything he has in mind: 
he does not hide anything, but opens his heart and mind completely to other people through his 
discourse. In parrhesia, the speaker is supposed to give a complete and exact account of what he 
has in mind so that the audience is able to comprehend exactly what the speaker thinks...For in 
parrhesia, the speaker makes it manifestly clear and obvious that what he says is his own 
opinion. And he does this by avoiding any kind of rhetorical form which would veil what he 
thinks. Instead, the parrhesiastes uses the most direct words and forms of expression he can find” 
(12).  
 
Parrhesia is understood to be direct and wholly expresses truth and sincerely held beliefs. Since a 
condition of parrhesia is to completely articulate a belief, “the speaker makes it manifestly clear 
and obvious that what he says is his own opinion” (Foucault 12). Foucault writes that there are 
two types of parrhesia, “First, there is a pejorative sense of the word not very far from 
‘chattering’ and which consists in saying anything or everything one has in mind without 
qualification” (13). Of course the risk in this “bad parrhesia”, as Foucault calls it, is that anyone 
one is free to say anything, even, “the most stupid or dangerous things.” This is contrasted with 
the more common, more positive parrhesia, in which an individual strive to tell “the truth”, their 
versions of the truth. Foucault writes:  
 
“But does the parrhesiastes say what he thinks is true, or does he say what is really true? To my 
mind, the parrhesiastes says what is true because he knows that it is true; and he knows that it is 
true because it is really true. The parrhesiastes is not only sincere and says what is his opinion, 
but his opinion is also the truth. He says what he knows to be true. The second characteristic of 
parrhesia, then, is that there is always an exact coincidence between belief and truth” (Foucault 
14).  
 
  
In other words, a true parrhesiastes is a truth holding individual who clearly articulates such 
truth. An observer of true parrhesia ought to have no doubts over his or her “own possession of 
the truth.” In contrast, one practicing bad parrhesia, something that Foucault deems as 
disingenuous parrhesia, is one who potentially speaks just for the sake of speaking, not for the 
sake of truth exploration. It would be reasonable for a skeptic of parrhesia to argue that 
individuals could construe their own versions of their truths just to maliciously articulate 
sentiment with the sole purpose of offending others. Foucault, however, does not see this as an 
issue and defends parrhesia by arguing that:  
 
“There does not seem to be a problem about the acquisition of the truth since such truth-having is 
guaranteed by the possession of certain moral qualities: when someone has certain moral 
qualities, then that is the proof that he has access to truth and vice versa. The ‘parrhesiastic 
game’ presupposes that the parrhesiastes is someone who has the moral qualities which are 
required, first, to know the truth, and, secondly, to convey such truth to others...If there is kind of 
proof of the sincerity of the parrhesiastes, it is his courage. The fact that a speaker says 
something dangerous - different from what the majority believes is a strong indication that he is a 
parrhesiastes” (Foucault 15).  
 
Through his discussions of ancient works, Foucault recognizes that there is an inherent good in 
openly speaking truth, and that some individuals possess moral traits that qualify them to hold 
and speak truth. Sometimes, truth tellers must risk their own comfort and safety in order to share 
their truths. A requirement of a Foucault-ian parrhesiastes is that he or she sometimes blatantly 
go against what makes the majority comfortable, or what the majority wants to hear. Foucault 
reasonably sees nobility and courage in true a parrhesiastes. He explains that danger is an 
inevitable condition of parrhesia. When one speaks truth, he or she recognizes and accepts this 
danger and proceeds with the speech in spite of it. There is inherent danger in an individual 
making him or herself vulnerable enough to speak his or her truth, no matter whether their truth 
seems admirable or abhorrent. This does not always necessarily denote bodily harm, but does 
  
have the capacity to upset, anger, or offend another. Though Foucault never directly asserts this, 
people do, especially today, have the tendency to equate their identities and self-worth with their 
ideas and their values. If someone articulates truth that is contrary to what an individual values, 
one may have trouble understanding that it was not his or her identity and character that was 
challenged, and that in reality just an idea was challenged. This has the potential to create feuds 
and vexatious social tensions. Because it is becoming increasingly difficult to converse without 
one party believing that one’s character is being personally attacked, whenever one engages in 
parrhesia, he or she runs the risk that his or her words will be misinterpreted in a negative 
manner. Danger, then, comes for the “interlocutor” in the forms of potentially offending, souring 
relationships, and, in extreme cases, bodily harm. Foucault explains: “The parrhesiastes is 
someone who takes a risk. Of course, this risk is not always a risk of life. When, for example, 
you see a friend doing something wrong and you risk incurring his anger by telling him he is 
wrong, you are acting as a parrhesiastes. In such a case, you do not risk your life, but you may 
hurt him by your remarks, and your friendship may consequently suffer for it. If, in a political 
debate, an orator risks losing his popularity because his opinions are contrary to the majority's 
opinion, or his opinions may usher in a political scandal, he uses parrhesia. Parrhesia, then, is 
linked to courage in the face of danger: it demands the courage to speak the truth in spite of some 
danger. And in its extreme form, telling the truth takes place in the "game" of life or 
death...When you accept the parrhesiastic game in which your own life is exposed, you are 
taking up a specific relationship to yourself: you risk death to tell the truth instead of reposing in 
the security of a life where the truth goes unspoken” (Foucault 16-7). Danger and courage are 
conditions necessary for parrhesia, according to Foucault. Foucault explains another 
characteristic of parrhesia which is that those who exercise parrhesia do so with the intent of 
  
criticizing or critiquing a position that the majority likely holds. This creates a naturally 
uncomfortable situation for the speaker. Presumably, one will not take the risk and let him or 
herself be vulnerable unless he or she is certain, in his or her own mind, that the opinion is true 
and somehow better than the opinion being argued against. So, anyone who is courageous 
enough to speak out directly against something, must hold opinions that are unquestionable in his 
or her mind and accept the risks associated with parrhesia.  
 The final condition of parrhesia, as Foucault describes, is a sense of duty. It is the 
intrinsic duty of one exercising speech to tell his or her truth. Foucault notes that the observer of 
parrhesia is free to keep silent, and no outside forces can compel him or her to speak. One who 
consciously decides to practice parrhesia is thus bound, in a deontological sense, to speak his or 
her known truth. It is quite possible that two observers of parrhesia could view the same situation 
but have totally opposite truths they want to be voiced. Making the conscious decision to speak 
one's own truth because he or she feels it necessary, even the face of opposition, signifies that 
that individual is steadfast and genuine in his or her beliefs, has accepted the risks involved in 
open expression, and feels that it is incumbent upon him or herself to speak the truth. In sum, 
parrhesia is a direct way that one speaks his or her truth, even when that truth is critical of 
commonly believed sentiment and has the potential to cause the interlocutor danger and 
discomfort. It should be noted that Foucault thinks that true parrhesia is essential to democracies 
as it encourages the exploration of truth, even if doing so may be uncomfortable. Yet, at the same 
time, Foucault worries that democracies do not welcome genuine parrhesia and rather opt to 
celebrate speech that only coincides with their values regardless of whether or not such sentiment 
actually reflects truth. This type of fake parrhesia could harm democracies if left unchecked. So 
Foucault would likely make the argument that true parrhesia is essential for democracies, but 
  
presently fake parrhesia, under the guise of genuine parrhesia, threatens them. This type of good 
versus bad parrhesia gives way to an interesting dichotomy between Mill and Foucault. Though 
they both are naturally skeptical of limitations on speech, Mill would likely not consider 
Foucault’s bad parrhesia to be a societal problem. Instead, Mill would probably just accept that 
what Foucault criticized in bad parrhesia is a natural byproduct of a free society with free speech. 
Not only would Mill not worry about this bad speech, he would also likely be confident that 
hateful or senseless speakers would be met with significant push back and societal pressures. 
Though Mill would likely disagree, it is, however still reasonable for the modern practitioner of 
free speech to be wary of offensive and baseless babbling.  
 Because of the First Amendment, the United States could be seen, to a skeptic of 
parrhesia, as a breeding ground for the bad parrhesia Foucault describes. One could reasonably 
think that because everyone enjoys speech protections, people could start intentionally trying to 
offend, spewing ridiculous rhetoric, or just speak for the sake speaking. Foucault shares this 
apprehension and explains: “Democracy is founded by a...constitution, where the...the people, 
exercise power, and where everyone is equal in front of the law. Such a constitution, however, is 
condemned to give equal place to all forms of parrhesia, even the worst. Because parrhesia is 
given even to the worst citizens, the overwhelming influence of bad, immoral, or ignorant 
speakers may lead the citizenry into tyranny, or may otherwise endanger the city” (Foucault 77). 
Mill, too, recognized an issue like this with regards to broad speech protections. Mill reasoned 
that any speech that harms or has to potential to harm individuals ought to be censored. But the 
issue here is what to do about speech that harms democracies, not individuals. This raises the 
question of whether or not speech that harms democracies should be subject to the same type of  
  
restrictions that Mill calls for when speech harms, or has the potential to harm, individuals. 
Foucault noticed, through his observances of ancient Greek texts, that ancient Athenian 
democracies practiced the type of parrhesia that was harmful to democracies. They had the 
tendency, as a democracy, to only welcome orators they wanted to hear, not necessarily the 
orators who spoke truths.  
 
Foucault and Classical Texts:  
 Foucault maintains that free speech is necessary for a democracy, but also recognizes that 
it has the capacity to threaten its existence if used improperly, as was the case with the 
Athenians. Foucault knows that free speech is a right that everyone in a democracy has. All 
people, both good and bad are free to express themselves in any way they see fit. This can enable 
individuals with less than admirable intentions to organize and potentially act in manners that 
threaten democratic societies. Foucault grapples with this democratic dilemma. One extreme 
solution, he explains, is the aristocratic thesis, which argues democracy can be best preserved 
when a social order is followed. This means that laws would made by the most “skillful” and 
qualified people, and that the aristocracy would “consult about the affairs of the state and put a 
stop to unruly persons having a seat in the council or speaking or taking part in the assembly of 
the people.” Foucault contrasts this position with a more restrained one, held by Isocrates by 
explaining that individuals as a whole ought to break the unfortunate habit of only being 
receptive to positions with which they agree or find palatable, and instead start accepting the 
“honest orator.” An honest orator is one who tries to change the attitudes and wills of the citizens 
for the better, because that which is beneficial to citizens is, by default, beneficial to a 
democratic state. 
  
 Foucault champions the notion that a democracy benefits when a variety of opinions are 
voiced. Unfortunately, he observes a deterioration of traditional democratic values in Athenian 
democracies not practicing genuine parrhesia, and recognizes that it is often the “flattering” 
orator, rather than the “honest orator” who is in practice welcomed in democracies. He writes 
that, “real parrhesia, parrhesia in its positive, critical sense, does not exist where democracy 
exists” (Foucault 83). This is because democracies have the tendency to ostracize orators whose 
speech does not appeal to the masses, and a condition of authentic parrhesia is that sentiment that 
critiques commonly held views be welcomed and expressed. Thus, democracies and bona fide 
parrhesia cannot coexist.  
 Such suppression of the “honest orator” is alarming and should actively be rejected as 
suppressing an “honest orator” gives rise to a new type of democracy that contradicts traditional 
democracy. Foucault seems to operate on the notion that traditional democracy is virtuous and 
ought to be preserved. He indicates that the characteristics of traditional democracy include the 
pursuit of happiness, liberty and equality before the law. The new type of democracy that lends 
itself to censorship of views not shared by the majority is not an exemplar of traditional 
democratic values. This new type of democracy is not even a democracy at all. Rather, it is an 
oblivious and self-centered society that seeks to make sure that the majority is never exposed to 
new and potentially uncomfortable world views, all while hiding behind the guise of a 
democracy. Foucault would likely argue that it is incumbent on individuals in the free world to 
actively ensure that this type of disingenuous democracy never comes to fruition. Foucault 
writes, “Democracy has become lack of self-restraint, liberty has become lawlessness, happiness 
has become the freedom to do whatever one pleases, and equality in front of the law has become 
parrhesia. Parrhesia in this text has only a negative, pejorative sense” (Foucault 83). Thus, it is 
  
becoming harder for positive parrhesia to coexist with a traditional democracy. To address this 
problem of democracies fearing parrhesia, Foucault comes up with a new use of parrhesia, that 
he labels philosophical parrhesia.  
 The purpose of philosophical parrhesia is not necessarily to persuade the masses, but to 
rather converse with individuals while espousing truths. This is very different from the 
individualistic Millian ideal of speech. Mill wants all people to be able to voice their opinions 
without society bearing down on individual liberties. Judging by Foucault’s praise for 
philosophical parrhesia, he does not seem to share the same individualistic goal as Mill. The aim 
of philosophical parrhesia is to expose individuals to new, various ideas with the aim of 
potentially getting someone to change his or her ways. Mill’s idea of speech is not necessarily 
aimed at unequivocal truth telling, but rather at freedom of individual expression. Obtaining 
Foucault’s ideal of philosophical parrhesia can hence be incredibly difficult as it requires an 
individual to modify his or her previously held beliefs and subsequently change “one's style of 
life, one's relation to others, and one's relation to oneself.” Philosophical parrhesia also implies a 
“complex set of connections between the self and truth.” Foucault elaborates, “For not only are 
these practices supposed to endow the individual with self-knowledge, this self-knowledge in 
turn is supposed to grant access to truth and further knowledge. The circle implied in knowing 
the truth about oneself in order to know the truth is characteristic of parrhesiastic practice” 
(Foucault 107). Individuals are required to know what they believe, why they believe it, and why 
they know that it is true. They must be aware of what influenced their views and why they know 
their views are correct to them. This type of constant self-discovery and awareness allows 
parrhesia and truth acquisition to happen. Foucault observes the use of philosophical parrhesia 
happening in three different types of human relationships: in communal life, in public life, and in 
  
interpersonal relationships. In all three situations, he always favors the practice of genuine 
parrhesia. He thinks that in every facet of life, there are qualified truth tellers in juxtaposition 
with unqualified babblers. His overarching argument is that it is always better for individuals, for 
social progress and for democracies when qualified truth tellers are encouraged to speak truth, 
even when the majority does not necessarily want to hear this.  
 In communal life, Foucault sees parrhesia as virtuous and necessary. He praises the 
ancient communal practice of “mutual confession” in which community members share their 
thoughts, ideas, feelings, misdoings, and more. He implies that this sort of openness is conducive 
for a productive and happy community, and that this can only be achieved through parrhesia. 
Using parrhesia in public life ought to be thought of as an extension of parrhesia in communal 
life since public affairs is really just a community of communities. In public life, in order to 
foster productive dialogue, a variety of perspectives should be welcomed. Properly practicing 
parrhesia helps ensure that truth tellers are heard. For Foucault, all truths should be told, whether 
they be harsh truths or truths that are palatable to the masses. This practice of pushing for all 
truths to be told ensures that the undemocratic characteristic of only listening to “flatterers”, or 
orators who articulate the opinions of the majority that is associated with the new type does not 
take place. Foucault favors fearless speech because democracies who intentionally or 
unintentionally self-censor uncomfortable truths are undemocratic. Finally, parrhesia in our 
interpersonal relationships is perhaps both the most important and most difficult to master as it 
requires individuals to be willing to potentially let go of deep seated beliefs to which they tend to 
tie their character and sense of self. Foucault thinks individuals would benefit from trying to 
always practice parrhesia and closely associating themselves with an individual who effectively 
practices positive parrhesia. He explains that “we are our own flatterers, and it is in order to 
  
disconnect this spontaneous relation we have to ourselves, to rid ourselves of our philautia, that 
we need a parrhesiastes” (Foucault 135). This is admittedly a difficult task. If progress is to me 
made, individuals must be wary of “self-delusion” and avoid associating with a flatterer 
disguised as a parrhesiastes. Foucault sees open discussion and truth telling via parrhesia as 
good, virtuous, and something society ought to strive to master and attain. Left to its own 
devices, however, open discussion can harm democracies, Foucault argues, as evidenced by 
Athenians favoring flattering orators. He contrasts the Greek democracy with the Roman Empire. 
For him, the Empire was much more effective at practicing true parrhesia and seeking truth via 
qualified orators who may have spoken uncomfortable truths.  
At its core, parrhesia for Foucault requires the morally qualified individuals to be brave 
enough to speak their own truths. Foucault comes to this conclusion by analyzing the use of 
parrhesia in ancient Greek texts. He makes observations about how the Athenian democracies 
and notices that there seems to be tension between what people are comfortable hearing and to 
what truths they should be exposed. Foucault seems to always favor democracy and sees the 
practice of true parrhesia as a means of ensuring strong and lasting democracies. While his 
intentions were commendable, truth telling today should not be thought of as something for 
which one needs to be qualified. Truth telling ought not to be an elitist practice, but rather 
something that anyone can cultivate if desired. 
Though he does not really make normative arguments regarding how to come up with a 
set of ethical guidelines for contemporaries to approach free speech in Fearless Speech, he does 
seem to reject the Athenian use of parrhesia that only favored “flatterers” without adequately 
make use of “honest orators.” Nancy Luxon, however, reads Foucault as making normative 
  
arguments. She uses his work to help explain what individuals should do to create their own 
ethical speech guidelines.  
 
Luxon’s Normative Argument: 
According to Luxon, in order to create a set of moral standards regarding the exercise of 
free speech, we ought to internally develop “not a “body of knowledge”, but a “body of 
practices...without reference to an external order such as nature, custom, tradition, or religion” 
(Luxon 377). The end goal is to have individuals who do not seek to discover universal truths 
and reality, as there is no such thing, but to have individuals condition themselves so that they 
can and will act appropriately when engaging in parrhesia.  
As Luxon points out, it is the unfortunate tendency of modern day individuals to self- 
segregate and develop an “us versus them” type of divided mentality. We as humans, however 
should recognize that just by existing, we have much more in common with our contemporaries 
than we have differences. And, as Hume would add, we as humans are intrinsically united in the 
sense that we are able to develop moral codes not by reason alone, but by our fundamental 
faculties of the will, that each and every person naturally possesses, that help us decipher ethical 
and unethical behavior. While in an ideal world, it would be admirable to completely lose the 
divided mentality, it would be insurmountable to do so in actuality. Luxon explains that the 
challenge “then, is the challenge of living with, overcoming, or transforming these divisions” 
(378). In order to avoid just “muddling through” life, individuals must seek “to discover and 
assert normative principles by which to act.” In order to begin to do this, one should strive to 
implement the Foucault-ian ethical standards of parrhesia.  
In implementing these Foucault-ian ethical standards of parrhesia, each individual should 
seek to employ these standards “in (his or her) relations to others rather than founding them on 
  
claims to knowledge” because the whole point of exercising free speech is not “produce 
individuals”, but rather is to enlighten individuals and expose them to alternative points of view 
(Luxon 378). Ethical standard are not one size fits all. They must be appropriately adapted and 
employed for specific situations regarding specific people. Foucault operates on the basis that 
each individual is born with a moral compass, and hopes that people will work with what they 
already have to intuitively condition themselves to behave appropriately in personal exchanges 
and relations. Luxon elaborates on this by writing, “the narrative occasioned by self-formation is 
not driven by an ethical ideal—it is not allegory—nor is it driven by the forward-moving, plot-
based action of desire. Instead, it works with the ambiguous ethical resources already possessed 
by individuals, and leaves to them the final shaping of these resources into something more” 
(381).  
It is imperative for individuals to try to understand their contemporaries and what 
influences their inner forces in order to independently develop a set of ethical standards. The 
goal is to put oneself in another’s shoes and try to comprehend what drives a person to hold a 
different view. In order to develop a set of ethical guidelines for approaching free speech, 
individuals must, at all times, be confident in themselves, in their relationships, and in their own 
ideas. Individuals must be able to recognize that when they engage in open expression, they are 
engaging with actual people who have actual emotions and feelings, just as they do. People must 
be aware that their identities and viewpoints are probably very different from that of the people 
with whom they converse, and not resort to personally attacking counterparts for not 
internalizing the same truths.  
Ethically exercising free speech must be seen as something that individuals can 
continually improve on and cultivate. People should always be trying to cultivate and grow their 
  
ethical codes as they become more exposed to alternative points of view. Developing an ever 
evolving stockpile of methods of morally reacting to uncomfortable situations is an attainable 
societal good, and not just as an abstract concept. Luxon writes about this continual cultivation 
by stating, “As individuals improve their ability to manipulate their curiosity, they learn to 
forestall immediate reactions and instead to maintain a steady attitude towards themselves, to 
attend to changes and reactions, and to sift through a raft of information—some sensory, some 
analytic—before drawing a conclusion” (387). This behavior is learned, not innate, must be 
practiced, and can be improved over time. Individuals must take responsibility and recognize 
their own unethical behavior when it occurs, reflect on it, resolve to improve their behavior, and 
demonstrate these improvements at the next available opportunity.  
People behave unethically when they act on the tensions between their viewpoint and that 
of another’s. Learning to be more curious about what one thinks and why he or she thinks that 
way both encourages open discussion, and gives people a chance to practice seeing individuals 
as individuals, rather than enemies who are too ignorant to see the truth. Likewise, in studying 
the ethics and morality of free speech, one must not forget that, “different individuals may 
achieve different harmonies that achieve different effects on the ear; no single model of ethical 
self-governance exists” (Luxon 389). 
 One must realize that if he or she is to truly develop ethical guidelines, that person must 
be willing to intentionally put him or herself in uncomfortable situations. Acting morally and 
ethically is a skill that needs to be developed, and by letting themselves be vulnerable and 
exposed to potentially offensive rhetoric, individuals can condition themselves to act morally and 
behave civilly. This of course, in no way means that individuals have to remain silent and just 
passively listen to speech. In fact, one of the best ways to cultivate one’s moral compass is to 
  
intentionally engage with people he or she would normally try to avoid. Even if each party walks 
away with the exact same convictions as they walked in with, intentionally engaging with one’s 
dissidents enables people to start to see dissidents as people whose worldviews are different, and 
rightfully so, rather than insane, malicious, or unenlightened individuals.  
Understanding Foucault is essential if individuals want to create their own internal and 
unique ethical codes. One of his main convictions is that there are no universal principles when it 
comes to ethical codes. If one was to just say that individuals need to show one another respect, 
people would be left in the dark when it came time to negotiate and maneuver around offensive 
speech. Such a lack of universal principles are exactly why people need to come up with their 
own personalized internal ethical code. There is no question that free speech is necessary for 
democracies and for individual liberties. This leaves people to grapple with the important 
question of how to create ethical principles to be able to effectively engage in free speech.     
 
Chapter 4: Free Speech: An Ethical Approach 
As demonstrated by Mill, free speech is essential to individual liberty, but has the capacity to be 
used unequally, thus creating undesirable societal hierarchies. Such hierarchies subsequently 
threaten individual liberties. For Foucault, free speech is necessary for democracies, but can also 
harm them if left totally unchecked. The structures of democracy predispose them to evolve to 
only accept and celebrate speech that the majority wants to hear. We as citizens have a 
responsibility to negotiate this speech dilemma by establishing ethical practices. In this final 
chapter, I will use Sigal Ben-Porath’s Free Speech on Campus and Teresa Bejan’s analysis of 
Roger Williams in her work, Mere Civility to argue for a set of guidelines that could help 
Americans negotiate the speech dilemma in an ethical manner.  
  
 This chapter will focus on three separate, but related settings, in which individuals can 
ethically practice free speech; the “public square”, in an educational setting, and in the 
workplace. Transcending all of these spaces is the notion that there is a human element to free 
speech. Speech takes place between real people with real emotions and real life experiences. I 
operate on the basis that no human, identity, experience, or idea is inherently better than another. 
I suggest that people who want to ethically engage in speech should try to separate their opinions 
from their identities and be slow to conclude that a differing opinion is an ad hominem attack. I 
also suggest that free speech is binary - people either have the right to free speech, or they do 
not. Because speech is a zero sum game, essentially all speech must be permitted (barring, of 
course speech previously ruled unconstitutional). This means that people who choose to ethically 
engage in free speech must be not only be ready to converse with a dissident, but expect to do so. 
If people do this while keeping in mind they are conversing with a person who is as equally 
deserving of a voice, dignity and respect as they are, they will be well on their way to engaging 
in speech ethically.  
 It should be noted that these are merely suggestions that may be interpreted differently 
for different people. It is my hope that Americans can recognize that we all share our wonderful 
country and will genuinely want to speak to and treat our fellow citizens with dignity and 
respect. By this same token, I am not blind to the fact that there are people who genuinely only 
want to spew repugnant rhetoric and do so by hiding behind the guise of patriotism. And I 
concede that these people have the right to do so. Whether or not their speech is morally right, 
the First Amendment affords them the right.  I am however hopeful that these people only 
comprise a small subset of the population and that most Americans are capable of respectfully 
conversing about sensitive subject matter even when opinions differ and can appropriately 
  
employ some of the strategies outlined in this chapter to ensure that everyone, regardless of race, 
creed, religion, gender, sexuality and political orientation has an opportunity to speak, be heard 
and engage with people holding different stances and opinions. The notion that, as Justice Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg has said, “you can disagree without being disagreeable” is an attainable goal and 
a hallmark of American splendor. 
 
Speech in Public: 
One of the most central pillars of American democracy is the right for free speech and 
expression, as enshrined in the First Amendment. Generally, people are afforded the right to 
speak freely most often while in public places, whether that be on the sidewalk, in a park or on 
the internet. Though speech in the public square is a core American value, it is also the root of a 
plethora of social problems and tensions. The First Amendment in particular protects raunchy 
and offensive sentiment that tends to contradict social norms. It was not written to protect speech 
that people necessarily want to hear. As Bejan describes, this wide acceptance of speech, even 
when such speech is uncomfortable, is what Roger Williams understood so well and is what he 
valued when founding Rhode Island. Bejan writes, “He [Williams] put his theory to into practice 
by founding and governing a tolerant society himself. The hypothesis to be tested by Williams’s 
‘experiment’ in Rhode Island - ‘that a most flourishing civil state may stand and best be 
maintained...with a full liberty in religious concernments’.” She explains that Williams 
established a flourishing society via his unwavering commitment to ensuring that nobody’s 
speech rights would be compromised in the name of maintaining social order, especially the 
opinions of religious dissidents. She explains, “Residents were not simply ‘indulged’ in their 
dissent in adiaphora or comprehended in an inclusive national church. Rather, the 1663 royal 
charter of Rhode Island and Providence Plantations granted colonists the unheard of ‘free 
  
exercise and enjoyment of all their civil and religious rights’, regardless of religious affiliation, 
in a society with no established church at all.” (Bejan 51).  
Bejan explains that a priority for Williams was to establish “a safe haven for dissenters” 
and ensure “integrity, dignity, the goodness outside of the parameters of orthodoxy...and a 
respect for difference itself” (Bejan 51). Williams’s notions of civility is especially riveting 
because he was completely convinced that all people were capable of this. Unlike Mill and other 
imperialists who thought that some types of people were inherently more equipped to practice 
civil speech, Williams recognized civility “as a basic human capacity expressed across all 
cultures...and consistently refrained from equating civilization with civility” (Bejan 61-2). 
“Throughout his writings, Williams employed civility as a kind of minimal, sufficient condition 
qualifying one for toleration. So long as people were ‘but civil’, religious difference would pose 
no threat to the body politic; there would be no need to call down the sword of persecution” 
(Bejan 61). For Williams, civility and toleration went hand and hand and were essential for the 
viability of the society. He did not see danger in dissenters, but rather in uncivil individuals who 
silenced dissenters. Bejan explains, “What connected the Quakers as paragons of incivility with 
persecution in his eyes was their attempt to ‘cut off’ those who disagreed with them from civil 
life and conversation” (Bejan 72).  
Williams made these assertions in the 1600s, but they have never been more significant 
for the American political climate. We should strive to make our societies a safe haven for 
dissenters, just as Williams did. When individuals try to curtail and limit the speech of their 
counterparts, they are inherently exercising incivility and behaving unethically. Free speech is a 
zero sum game. We either have it, or we do not. This by no means implies that acting civilly and 
ethically when being presented with opposing speech is either easy or intuitive. Though it is 
  
necessary to make an attempt to welcome virtually all opinions, no matter how obnoxious or 
offensive, if only for the sake of preserving democratic traditions.  
If individuals truly want to take it upon themselves to ethically exercise free speech in 
public, they should first understand the following underlying principles. First and foremost, 
people should be able to trust that every person, regardless of culture, religion, gender, sexuality, 
etc. is inherently capable of the civility the Williams described. If people understand this, they 
could potentially be less likely to fall into the social hierarchies, of which Mill is fearful, that 
limit individual liberties. If people consciously choose to make efforts to see their peers as 
inherently benevolent and capable of disagreeing without being disagreeable, they will be more 
likely to successfully engage in ethical conversations without censoring or intimidating those 
with whom they disagree. Secondly, people should try to see the virtue in disagreement. While 
we may no longer have a need for some of our primordial instincts, recognizing that our fellow 
citizens are not inherently enemies is one we will likely not out-evolve any time soon. Different 
people have different life experiences. We, as Americans, should strive to understand the 
struggles and ideologically shaping experiences or our neighbors and cohorts. This type of 
cognizant empathy humanizes people in the eyes of their dissidents. If people start visualizing 
their adversaries as their equals and counterparts, rather than their enemies, it will likely be 
easier to disagree without being disagreeable. Of course, everyone should make a conscious and 
valiant effort to understand that no one life experience or idea is intrinsically superior or 
experiences holds does not automatically reflect his or her character. Furthermore, it ought to be 
understood that the opinions one holds can be controversial , and exercise an overabundance of 
caution when articulating ideas. People should be mentally prepared for pushback and should 
also be prepared to actively avoid attacking or degrading an adversary’s character. People ought 
  
to exercise this type of cautious understanding that there are always inevitable risks associated 
with recognizing and discussing differences if they want to work towards ethically exercising 
speech. Lastly, it would do free speech a world of good if people began to disassociate their 
sense of self and sense of identity with their opinions. Granted, this is quite a difficult task, but if 
individuals go through life with open minds, ready to change their opinions, it would be easier to 
engage ethical speech.  Many times conversations turn hostile because people are too 
psychologically attached to their opinions, that they mistake attacks on ideas as attacks on 
character. Identity then, should not be thought of as a psychological attachment between one’s 
opinions and one’s sense of self. Opinions are not inherently righteous or infallible, and it is a 
disservice to individuals who base their identities off of their opinions. Rather, identity should be 
seen as how the sum of one’s life experiences, adversities and unique qualities work together to 
shape the individual and his or her actions. One’s ability to respectfully handle him or herself in 
uncomfortable scenarios is a much greater reflection of character and identity than simply acting 
defensively or seeking to only converse with like-minded zealots. 
 
Speech In Education: 
Preserving and practicing free speech is perhaps most crucial in an educational 
environment. In the words of Congressman Crenshaw, “We go to universities to be challenged, 
not coddled. Words are not violence. Try hard not to offend others, but try even harder to not be 
offended either. Free speech - uninfringed - makes our society stronger.” 
One of the most pressing problems for campus speech is the growing tendency to misuse 
the Millian harm principle and censor uncomfortable speech as opposed to genuinely harmful 
speech. To reiterate, Mill guides free societies to only censor speech that causes harm or has the 
potential to do so, offensive or uncomfortable speech is typically not harmful speech. Censorship 
  
of speech on campus not only impedes intellectual growth, it also victimizes individuals with 
unconventional opinions and ways of perceiving the world. Censoring speech on campus creates 
a “holier than thou” hierarchy that is inherently incompatible with being intellectually 
challenged. Choosing to ethically engage in and welcome free speech in educational settings 
works to resolve this unfortunate misapplication of the Millian harm principle.  
The goal of institutionalized education is to typically condition an individual to be a 
successful and constructive member of society. Of course in schooling, individuals are taught 
and tested on facts in information regarding history, math, science and the like. And it is true that 
almost any career requires the completion of at least some form of schooling. But the reality is 
that most of these trivial facts will not be remembered or utilized when an individual inevitably 
leaves the school setting. Rather what tends to have more of a lasting impact on people is how 
they were socialized and were taught to interact with one another, especially when they are faced 
with individuals holding opposing viewpoints. This is why a commitment to free speech is so 
imperative in the school setting, and must be applied. Individuals ought to be exposed to as many 
different opinions as possible so that when they move on from school they are equipped to 
handle as many social situations as possible. It should be noted that a wide acceptance and 
encouragement of speech ought to mostly apply to opinion and not established factual 
information. For example, individuals should respectfully discuss how their different life 
experiences led them to view the same presidential candidate differently. People should not on, 
the other hand, be encouraged to accept someone’s idea that two plus two equals five. It is an 
established mathematical law that two plus two does not equal five and the laws of mathematics 
do not seem likely to change any time soon, thus such a blatantly nonfactual notion should not be 
entertained. This idea that the free expression of ideas and opinions ought to be encouraged in a 
  
school setting is especially important in the university setting as universities, even more so than 
primary and secondary schools, try to groom individuals to be constructive members of society 
upon graduation. 
Free expression in the university setting is essential to prepare students to graduate and 
conduct themselves appropriately when interacting with people after graduation and outside of 
the university setting. Unfortunately, however, what type of speech is or is not in practice 
allowed on college campuses has recently become the subject of hot debates. The practice of 
self-policing speech on college campuses tends to have been on the rise for the past five years as 
evidenced by the pushback, and violence in extreme instances, received by speakers at the 
University of California Berkeley, George Washington University, and more. It has not been a 
secret that colleges and universities sometimes invite controversial speakers, who are usually but 
not always Conservatives, to give talks to students. With such strong views on such sensitive 
subjects, it is not really surprising that high profile speakers and speeches are constantly met with 
protests. Typically, protesters simply use their free speech to express disagreement with a 
controversial speaker’s free speech - nothing out of the ordinary, and very much in accord with 
the Millian principle of welcoming all types of speech but pushing back against, or shaming 
opprobrious speech. What is out of the ordinary, however, is that lengths that students, and 
sometimes even college administrators, have been going to either prevent speakers from visiting 
campus or to stop their speeches from progressing once they are already on campus. This is 
where the mishandling of the harm principle is painfully apparent. Students and administrators at 
colleges and universities, including but not limited UC Berkeley and George Washington 
University are refusing to give a platform to an inherently non-violent speech. Campus speakers 
do not intend harm by doing something like exciting a mob as the hypothetical Millian orator in 
  
front of the corn dealer’s house. Rather, they just want to share their opinions and truths to a 
shapeable audience, which is a revered Foucault-ian ideal. Additionally, by shutting down 
unconventional speech by labeling it as harmful, people who censor speech send the message 
that they are inherently more scrupulous than their dissidents. We should naturally want to avoid 
this cycle of victimization that constantly puts people down or makes them feel like their 
opinions make them inferior to others. It should go without saying that ethically exercising free 
speech in educational settings is essential for intellectual development. Furthermore, respectfully 
listening to speech, even controversial and unpopular speech, is an essential life skill that ought 
to be fostered and practiced in educational settings.  
Free speech ought to be welcomed on college campuses, as it is essential for intellectual 
growth and leads to the development of paramount life skills. It is understandable that a college 
wants to ensure the safety of all students, and there are certain steps schools can take to ensure 
that everyone has free speech while keeping vulnerable and marginalized students safe. In her 
new book, Free Speech on Campus, Sigal Ben-Porath argues for being actively attuned to the 
speech of others as well as for the creation of conditions, such as safe spaces and free speech 
monitors that bring all individuals into a conversation. 
Whether it be through established safe spaces or open discussions, students in a 
university setting ought to feel safe to express opinions and that such opinions are valid, if 
universities are to perform their duties of fostering intellectual development and preparing 
students for civic life. She argues for the creation of conditions, such as “safe spaces” and “open 
expression monitors”, that bring vulnerable individuals into a conversation (Ben-Porath 113). It 
should be noted here that safe spaces do not foster the sort of blind civility that leads people to 
self-censor, as Bejan describes. Bejan worries that if people are so focused on toleration and 
  
acting civilly, they will devolve and tend to over expurgate speech and ideas. She fears that 
eventually nobody will be able to say anything or disagree with anyone without being met with 
unfair criticism.  Instead to avoid this mindless downward spiral towards tongue holding, 
campuses should seek to foster intellectual safe spaces. Intellectual safe spaces should be thought 
of as individuals, collectively, consciously, and willingly committing to give their peers and 
classmates opportunities to share opinions without interruption and under the notion that it is 
acceptable to respectfully push back against completely articulated ideas, so as to foster 
productive conversation. In choosing to be a part of an intellectual safe space, individuals must 
earnestly make an effort to practice the cautious understanding that involves them recognizing 
that individuals just naturally have different world views. This also requires individuals to again 
recognize that opinions are not one’s identity, nor are they a good indicator of one’s character. In 
intellectual safe spaces, individuals should be able to voice their opinions and converse with 
people holding different opinions while being aware that a differing opinion does not degrade 
another individual, nor does a differing opinion automatically denote an attack on one’s 
character. Vulnerable groups, such as minorities and members of the LGBTQ+ community and 
Muslims, are of utmost importance in being given a platform to speak. Ben-Porath recognizes 
vulnerable groups are free to speak de jure, though not always de facto. She sees the possibility 
that such groups will not exercise their free speech because they may be intimidated to speak up.  
Granted, when free speech is observed, there is always the potential that people will have 
trouble separating an attack on an idea from an attack on the character. It is quite possible that 
even when people make valiant efforts to ethically engage in free speech, someone could still be 
offended or feel victimized. This is likely inevitable, but  can be in part remedied by inclusive 
freedom of speech, which guarantees voices to the dissidents and those offended in order to 
  
avoid the dreaded Millian social hierarchy of people who use their speech and people who do 
not. In order to prevent both the dangerous self-policing of free speech on campus and the 
undesirable social hierarchy, schools must foster an environment in which everyone hears 
everyone and everyone is encouraged to use their own free speech to counter the free speech of 
another. This freedom to use one’s free speech to counter and critique the free speech of another 
protects Ben-Porath’s ideal of dignitary safety and upholds what Mill prescribed to deal with 
uncomfortable speech. The right of individuals to respond to offensive rhetoric enables those 
individuals to be an equal member of the discussion. Ensuring such dignitary safety tells all 
individuals that their opinions are valid and matter no less than those of anyone else. Every 
opinion ought to be given a platform. When all sides of an opinion are given the same 
opportunity to associate and express their opinions, genuine learning and critical thinking takes 
place. It is imperative for individual to realize that free speech is a two way street. One must be 
unafraid to speak and subsequently be willing and ready to listen, without interrupting or 
interjecting, to opposing points of view. Then, the individual who spoke initially must have the 
chance to respond to the second individual. This cycle should be repeated as many times as 
necessary until both individuals have completely flushed out their arguments as it ensures that no 
opinion goes left unsaid and gives individuals chances to appropriately refute their peers as 
necessary. It would be delusional of me to assume that people will always want to respond to a 
dissident’s opinions. Granted, this would be more effective if people are always eager to discuss 
their opinions with adversaries, this is just not a reality. When one encounters this scenario, he or 
she should first try to carefully elicit a response from an individual by using the Socratic Method 
and asking specific questions of what she or she makes of certain points of the conversations. If 
this fails, he or she might want to extend an offer to continue the debate at a later time after both 
  
parties have had the chance to reflect and organize their thoughts. If this is unsuccessful too, the 
individual may want to consider playing “devil’s advocate” for his or her own argument and 
potentially prompt his or her debate partner to begin making counterpoints as well. If this again, 
fails, the speaker should recognize that some people are simply uninterested in discussions and 
respectfully remove him or herself from the situation knowing that he or she made a noble effort 
to ethically engage in speech and made an effort to foster a respectful and open discussion. This 
is not a perfect world, but actively making multi-faced efforts to encourage speech goes a long 
way. The goal of this respectful and calculated speech is to equip students with internal protocols 
for responding to seemingly outrageous speech from individuals, as encountering disrespectful 
and offensive people in life is almost guaranteed. Thus, an effective way of ethically practicing 
free speech on a college campus is for an individual to discuss his or her opinions with a wide 
range of diverse individuals and understand that he or she will likely be met with dissidents, 
which can be uncomfortable at times. This should be embraced on a college campus instead of 
seen as something against which to guard.  
 
Careers and Speech:  
Ethically navigating speech in the workplace is imperative as adults spend most of their 
waking hours in the workplace. For the most part, speech in the workplace should be seen as an 
extension of speech in an educational setting. In an ideal world, individuals will learn to conduct 
themselves ethically and respectfully while they are in school, regardless of how much schooling 
they have had, before they enter the workforce. Approaching speech in the workplace is, 
however, inherently different from speech in the university or educational setting since school 
and work typically serve different functions for individuals. Whereas the role of education is to 
prepare people for society, the role of careers is typically for individuals to make enough money 
  
to meet their basic needs. While it is a nice thought to have, careers are not always for the 
betterment of individuals or of society. Universities and schools almost have an obligation to 
teach individuals how to behave when the leave the educational setting. In the workforce, there is 
no such obligation, and the focus is much more on individualistic needs and individualistic 
success. Because of this, speech in the workforce should be approached with more caution, 
reservation, and even moderate self-restraint in extreme situations.  
 A central theme in Bejan’s Mere Civility, is her worry that in contemporary times, 
individuals are so concerned with trying to be civil and are hyper aware to not offend people 
through their words, actions, and macroaggressions that they actually begin to self-censor. In 
more simple terms, there is the possibility that individuals are so fearful that they might 
accidentally offend someone, that they hold their tongues. Bejan of course wants us, as 
Americans, to break this habit. This presents a tricky dilemma as the workplace is a unique 
environment in which it might actually be logical and worthwhile to exercise an overabundance 
of caution, but at the same time Americans deserve the freedom to speak and express themselves 
at their place of work. 
 It goes without saying that the inherent danger in boldly exercising speech in the 
workplace is termination, especially if one works for a private organization. When one accepts a 
job offer, he or she may sign, and thus accepts the terms of, a contractual agreement that outlines 
the company’s rules, regulations and punitive policies. Sometimes companies do not have their 
new employees sign a physical agreement, but by agreeing to be employed, the individual 
inherently and willingly enters a sort of “social contract.”  
Regardless of how one accepts employment, a principal - agent relationship is formed. 
An employee is the agent of and reflects the image of the principal, the places of employment. 
  
While the American government cannot regulate, for the most part, how one chooses to speak 
and express him or herself, his or her place of work certainly can. Therefore, he or should 
exercise caution when engaging in speech or expression if he or she does not want to accept the 
risk of termination. Take for example, the National Football League (NFL), the principal and 
employer of the agents, or the players. Recently there has been much controversy over whether 
or not NFL players can, or should, protest what they see as unfair race relations in the United 
States by kneeling during the national anthem. The Supreme Court has established in Texas vs. 
Johnson that flag desecration is permissible under the First Amendment. It follows that kneeling 
during the national anthem has the same effect and is thus legally permissible. The National 
Football League, however, has the right to say that it does not want this behavior associated with 
the organization and can refuse to employ kneelers. When one wants to exercise speech or 
expression at work, especially something controversial as kneeling for the national anthem, he or 
she must willingly accept the potential retaliatory actions of the employer. Of course this also 
applies to less high profile situations such as mundane office jobs. In 2017, Google terminated a 
gentleman after he explained in a written memo that “genetic differences” may explain “why we 
don’t see equal representation of women in tech and leadership.” This memo was perceived as 
offensive, harmful and sexist rhetoric, though not illegal. Google, a private company, did not 
want to be associated with this type of rhetoric and released him from his position. His memo is 
protected by the First Amendment, so Congress can make no law banning this type or rhetoric, 
but his employer is under no legal obligation to tolerate his free speech. 
These two examples are a prime illustrations of how employers have not tolerated free 
speech in the workplace. I am not arguing that a private employer does not have the right to 
terminate an employee whose speech they deem inappropriate. But, just because employers have 
  
this right, does not necessarily make it ethically right. Free speech is a two way street, and it 
would do employers a world of good to be consciously aware that their employees spend most of 
their adult lives serving their company. Free speech in the workplace has a plethora of benefits 
included, but not limited to, fostering new and innovative ideas, and increasing trust between 
employers and employees. The prior two examples of unacceptable speech in the workplace 
seem to be rather extreme. When navigating speech in the workplace, Americans typically 
should not think of speech in such bold terms, but should rather be concerned with the subtle, 
more mundane expressions of speech in the workplace such as mindless conversations with 
coworkers and cubicles decorated with political memorabilia. In order for speech to be socially 
acceptable in the workplace, both employers and employees must recognize that again, different 
people have different life experiences, creating different opinions and world views, and embrace 
these differences. People must be cautiously prepared to have difficult conversations, to walk 
away from uncomfortable situations when necessary, and again recognize that differing opinions 
are not ad hominem attacks.       
Through her historical analysis of seventeenth century religious persecution in Europe, 
Bejan points to what seems to be an inherent human desire to ban or outlaw harmful or offensive 
sentiment. This held true for prominent seventeenth century thinkers including Hobbes and 
Locke. Bejan cautions against being so civil as to censor oneself as she writes, “Like the early 
modern eirenicists...his positive vision of concordia led Locke to conflate the manner of 
disagreement with the fact. In the end, he readily sacrificed diversity for the sake of 
peaceful...disagreement” (Bejan 143). Bejan advocates for a society that embodies the ideals of 
Roger Williams by fostering civility that “can actually accommodate more and deeper kinds of 
difference than the alternatives, while sustaining a commitment to fundamental disagreement 
  
despite its inherent disagreeableness” (Bejan 14). Undoubtedly this is a noble goal that society 
should strive to achieve. When it comes to the workplace, speech should not suffer, but should 
be approached more cautiously than speech in public and speech in education. People need to 
realize that the risks in voicing strong opinions are higher at one’s place of work than they are in 
the classroom or in the public square. 
  This is not to say that people ought to strive for the lack of intellectual diversity that 
Locke hinted at is at work, it is just to say that an extra cost-benefit analysis should be performed 
when speaking at work. If an individual does not want to run the risk of being terminated, then 
he or she should be overly cautious about how he or she speaks and acts. This is not to say that 
he or she should not speak or act. But, he or she should consider how the speech could come 
across to a coworker or a boss. Individuals should then either preface what they are about to say 
with an acknowledgement that it could be potentially controversial and that they wish no offense 
to come from it and then consequently invite discussion. Of course, in an ideal world, individuals 
would feel safe enough to express their raucous opinions and have open discussions about them 
in the workforce as is encouraged in an educational setting. Unfortunately, the stakes are high in 
the professional world, and if individuals are not willing to lose their jobs, they probably should 
either take the aforementioned preemptive steps to mitigate the negative repercussions of speech 
or just avoid articulating audacious opinions and exercise the same type of civility that leads to 
the same type of self-restraint against which Bejan pushes back.  
Of course, there seems to be no way to ensure that individuals follow these guidelines, or 
will even care enough to actively want to engage in speech. But it is my conviction that people 
are intrinsically benevolent and inclined to behave ethically. And of course, as is with every 
society, there are heavy lifters and there are free riders. This ethical code will only be effective if 
  
people choose to follow it. Some people will try more than others. It is my hope however that 
more people than not will choose to commit to respectful disagreements and preserving the 
dignities of their counterparts. It is my hope that people do not shy away from uncomfortable 
conversations, but rather embrace them. Diversity in individuals and in intellect, which is 
achieved through open discussion, is what makes the United States the magnificent country that 
it is.  
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